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Abstract
We study simultaneous ascending auctions of identical objects when
bidders are ﬁnancially constrained and their valuations exhibit com-
plementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the
values for individual objects are private information, and characterize
noncollusive equilibria.
The equilibria exhibit the exposure problem. The bidder with the
highest budget is more reluctant to bid, because the bidder with the
lowest budget may end up pursuing only one object, thus preventing
the realization of complementarities. In some states of the world both
objects are assigned to the ‘poorer’ bidder although that bidder has a
lower valuation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since their introduction by the Federal Communication Commission in 1994
simultaneous ascending auctions have become a commonly used auction for-
mat for the sale of multiple objects. One reason for their popularity is
that they allow bidders to adjust their bids between diﬀerent objects as the
auction progresses in light of the new information about the likelihood of
obtaining diﬀerent subsets of objects. This is particularly useful when sig-
niﬁcant subsets of the objects on sale tend to exhibit complementaries (see
e.g. Szentes and Rosenthal [15]) and the bidders have a limited amount of
money for the auction, so that increasing the bid on one object decreases
the amount of money available for bidding on other objects. The practical
importance of budget constraints in the FCC auctions of spectrum licenses
has been pointed out, among others, by Salant [14].
The joint presence of complementarities and budget constraints makes
the theoretical analysis of the equilibria of simultaneous ascending auctions
particularly complex. The main issue appears to be the so-called ‘exposure
problem’. The expression is used to indicate that while bidding on an object
above its stand-alone value may be justiﬁed by the hope of buying it as a
component of a bundle whose total value is still above the total payment
implied by the current prices, doing so exposes a bidder to the risk of ending
up with having to buy that object alone, and thus earn a negative surplus.
At least in some cases the exposure problem induces bidders to bid less
aggressively than they would do by taking fully into account the value of
complementarities that can be realized. Although the exposure problem has
been identiﬁed in settings without budget constraints, in our setup it only
appears when both complementarities and budget constraints are present.
In this paper we focus on the interplay between complementarities and
budget constraints in simultaneous ascending auctions, and in order to make
the analysis tractable we limit attention to the case of known budget con-
straints. This is a good approximation of reality in some instances, and it is
au s e f u lﬁrst step for the analysis of the case with privately known budgets.
To our knowledge, there is no paper that deals simultaneously with com-
plementarities and budget constraints in ascending auctions. Instead, the
literature has separately introduced complementarities or budget constraints
in standard auction models.
2The eﬀect of complementarities in simultaneous auctions has been stud-
ied, among others, by Rosenthal and Wang [13], Krishna and Rosenthal [9],
Szentes and Rosenthal [15], [16], Englmaier et al. [7], Fang and Parreiras [8]
and Chakraborty [5]. In all these papers the auction formats that have been
considered are not of the ascending type; rather, these papers have focused
on variants of ﬁrst-price or second-price auctions. Our work is more re-
lated to Albano et al. [1] and Zheng [17]. These papers consider ascending
auctions in which some ‘global’ bidders have complementarities and want
to pursue both objects while other ‘local’ bidders pursue a single object.
The identity of global and local bidders is common knowledge, although
the stand-alone values and the complementarities are private information.
Neither Albano et al. [1] nor Zheng [17] consider the presence of budget
constraints, as we do. Another important diﬀerence is that we consider ex
ante identical bidders. By this we mean that the stand alone values and the
complementarities are drawn from the same distributions.
The impact of budget constraints for various auction formats has been
analyzed in a seminal paper by Che and Gale [6]. Benoît and Krishna [2]
have studied the impact of budget constraints on sequential auctions with
complete information. Finally, in Brusco and Lopomo [3] we have studied
simultaneous ascending auction without budget constraints with heteroge-
nous objects and either zero or large complementarities, and in Brusco and
Lopomo [4] we have analyzed simultaneous ascending auctions with privately
known budget constraints and homogeneous objects, but without comple-
mentarities.
We focus on ‘noncollusive’ equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which the bidders
do not try to split the objects when budget constraints are not binding.
Collusive equilibria may exist (depending on the distribution of values) but
the presence of budget constraints adds little to their analysis, and we refer
to the previous literature.
We always assume that stand—alone values are private knowledge, and
analyze both the case in which complementarities are common and known
and the case in which complementarities are private knowledge. In both
cases the noncollusive equilibrium is essentially unique and has the same
qualitative features. The most interesting eﬀect is the presence of the ex-
posure problem. It turns out that it is the bidder with the highest budget
who is aﬀected by the problem, since the ‘poor’ bidder may start demand-
3ing only one object when the budget becomes binding. Fearing exposure,
the ‘rich’ bidder leaves the auction earlier than a ‘poor’ bidder of the same
type. As a consequence, there are states of the world in which both objects
are assigned to the ‘poor’ bidder despite the fact that her valuation for the
objects is lower. We conclude that the presence of budget constraints cause
ineﬃciencies both because of an obvious direct eﬀect (i.e. the ‘poor’ bidder
may be unable to get both objects when her values are higher because the
budget is binding) and a more subtle strategic eﬀect, the so-called exposure
problem. Contrary to the direct eﬀect, the strategic eﬀects distorts eﬃciency
against the ‘rich’ bidder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we specify
the rules of the auction and the assumptions on the bidders’ preferences.
In Section 3 we analyze the case in which the complementarity terms are
common knowledge, strictly positive and identical for the two bidders, while
the stand-alone values are private information, and describe the equilibrium.
In Section 4 we study the case of privately known complementarities (as well
as stand—alone values), characterizing an equilibrium which is qualitatively
similar to the one found for the case of common complementarities. Section
6 contains concluding remarks, and an appendix collects the proofs.
2 The Model
There are two identical units of a good and two risk neutral bidders. Each
bidder i ∈ {1,2} is willing to pay vi for a single unit, and 2(vi + ki),k i ≥ 0,
for both units. We will refer to the variables vi and ki as bidder i’s ‘stand-
alone value’ and ‘complementarity premium’ respectively. (Note that ki is
the per-unit premium.) Bidder i’s surplus when she obtains n ∈ {1,2}





vi − m, if n =1 ,
2(vi + ki) − m, if n =2 .






, where k ≥ 0. The stand-alone values v1, v2 are identically
distributed, with c.d.f. F and diﬀerentiable density f, and the complemen-
tarity premia k1, k2 are identically distributed, with c.d.f. G and diﬀeren-
4tiable density g. The realization of the pair (vi,k i) is privately observed by
bidder i before the beginning of the auction.
We assume that each bidder i has a ﬁxed amount of money (budget) wi
for bidding, so that the total payment m cannot exceed the budget wi.T h e
budget levels w1 and w2 are common knowledge. To simplify the analysis
without altering the substance of our results we assume than 1 <w 1,w 2,s o
that any bidder can always bid up her stand-alone value (i.e. vi <w i, for
all vi ∈ [0,1]). However, bidder i is unable to bid up to her valuation for the
two-unit bundle whenever wi < 2(vi + ki). It is convenient to introduce the
notation hi ≡ wi
2 , since this is the highest unit price that bidder i can pay
when buying both objects. We assume that the two budgets are diﬀerent,
and without additional loss of generality we set w1 <w 2.
The objects are sold using a ‘simultaneous ascending clock auction’
(SACA) working as follows. Each bidder is given two buttons. There is
a single price which starts at zero and increases at constant speed, until at
least one bidder lifts at least one button. The general idea is that lifting l
buttons at price p means demanding l fewer units at any price higher than
p, until additional buttons are lifted. Thus by lifting one button at price p,
and the second button at p0 >p ,bidder i communicates that she is willing
to pay up to 2p for two units, and up to p0 for one unit.
Demand reduction is irreversible: once released a button cannot be pushed
again. This is the simplest version of the activity rules that are often used
in simultaneous ascending auctions1.
The continuous time format of the auction requires care in the speciﬁ-
cation of some details, in order to make sure that the resulting game form
is well deﬁned. As usual, the technical problem is that sometimes a player
wants to react to an action by her opponent as soon as possible, and this
may create an ‘open set problem’. In our case this happens, for example,
when the price is increasing and bidder 2 wants to end the auction as soon
as possible after bidder 1 lifts one button; that is, if bidder 1 lifts one button
at time τ, then bidder 2 wants to lift one of her buttons at the lowest time
t such that t>τ. This problem has no solution because the constraint set
1In most of the FCC auctions used for the sale of spectrum licenses variations of the
following basic rule were put in eﬀect: ‘a bidder that places eligible bids for n units at
round t cannot place bids for more than n units at any subsequent round t
0 >t . ’ (Milgrom
[12]).
5is open. To get around this issue, we specify that when one2 button is lifted
for the ﬁrst time, say by bidder 1, the price stops for an interval of time δ
during which bidder 2 is given a chance to reduce her demand at the same
price.3 We also want to allow bidder 1 to react to bidder 2’s reaction, and
so on until both bidders choose to do nothing, before the price can resume
its upward movement.
The formal speciﬁcation of the rules is as follows. Suppose that bidder i
is the ﬁr s tt ol i f te x a c t l yo n eb u t t o na tt i m et, when the price is pt. Then the
price stops raising, and bidder j 6= i is asked whether she wants to react by
lifting one or two buttons. If j lifts any button the auction ends; otherwise
bidder i is asked whether she wants to lift her second button. If she does, the
auction ends; and if she does not, the price resumes its upward movement
starting from pt, with bidder i pushing one button and bidder j pushing
two buttons. Thus the price may start moving again only after both bidders
have had a chance to react to the status quo and have chosen to do nothing.
The allocation of the objects and the price are determined as follows.
Let t denote the ﬁrst time at which bidder i reduces demand, i.e. releases
one or two buttons. If bidder i lifts two buttons, then her opponent j 6= i
buys both objects at unit price pt, unless j also releases two buttons at t,i n
which case the tie is broken by assigning the two-item bundle to each bidder
with probability 1
2. If both bidders release exactly one button at time t,
then each bidder buys one object at price pt. Finally, if bidder i releases
one button and j does nothing at t, the price stops for an interval of time
δ, during which j is given the opportunity to react: if j releases one button,
the auction ends with each bidder buying one unit at pt;i fj releases two
buttons, then i buys both objects at pt each;4 and if j does nothing, then i is
given a chance to release her second button in which case j gets both objects
at pt each, otherwise the price resumes its upward movement, starting from
pt+δ = pt.
In this last case, the auction ends as soon as any bidder releases another
button: if bidder j releases one or two buttons then each bidder buys one
object at the current price; if instead bidder i releases her second button,
2If more than one button is released, the auction ends.
3Zheng [17] has similar auction rules.
4This is because, as mentioned at the beginning of the section, lifting one button at
pt indicates willingness to buy both units for pt each, and at most one unit for any price
above pt.
6bidder j wins both objects.
A few remarks on the auction rules are in order. First, note that the
buttons are not object-speciﬁc. Therefore this auction format is equivalent
to one in which any bidder can resume bidding on any object, even if she has
not done so continuously since the beginning of the auction, as long as her
bidding activity (the number of objects on which she is bidding) does not
increase. This format, with the activity rule, is intermediate between the
case where exit on each object is irrevocable and the case with unrestricted
reentry.
Second, the tie-breaking rules are designed to maximize the probability
of realizing the complementarities, i.e. of assigning both objects to the same
bidder. This is why the two-unit bundle is allocated to one (randomly cho-
sen) bidder when both bidders reduce their demand to zero simultaneously.
Also, when one bidder reacts to the demand reduction of another bidder
lifting both buttons, both objects are allocated to the bidder who reduced
demand to one. By maximizing the probability of assigning both objects to
a single bidder we minimize the ineﬃciencies caused by the presence of po-
tentially binding budget constraints. If the tie-breaking rules were changed
the equilibria described in the next two sections would remain qualitatively
the same, but would entail additional distortions from the eﬃcient outcome.
In our analysis we rule out (weakly) dominated strategies, hence we focus
on equilibria where each bidder reduces demand to zero only after the price
becomes at least as large as the stand—alone value. Moreover, since our
main goal is to study the impact that the simultaneous presence of budget
constraints and complementarities has on the level of eﬃciency that can be
achieved in the SACA, we focus on ‘noncollusive’ equilibria, i.e. equilibria
in which the bidders bid ‘straightforwardly’ as much as possible. Equilibria
with a collusive ﬂavor, in which the bidders manage to coordinate on buying
one object each for a low price, can be constructed as follows.5 Suppose that
bidder 1 reduces demand to one when the price is 0, implicitly inviting the
opponent to split the objects. If this ‘oﬀer’ is declined (i.e. if bidder 2 does
not releases any of her buttons), the only optimal continuation strategy for
bidder 1 is to bid on a single unit up to her value v1, in which case bidder 2’s
optimal continuation strategy is to release one object at an optimally chosen
5We have studied collusive behavior in simultaneous ascending auctions in Brusco and
Lopomo [3].
7‘stopping time’. For some distributions of vi and ki, splitting the objects
at p =0is an equilibrium, and there can be similar equilibria inducing the
splitting of the objects at prices below h1.
We ignore collusive equilibria here because their existence does not hinge
on the presence of budget constraints. Our goal is to identify the distortions
from the ﬁrst best that arise in the SACA when both budget constraints
and complementarities are present. Thus we only consider ‘noncollusive’
strategies, according to which bidder i bids on both objects as long as p ≤
min{h1,v i + ki}, i.e. unless either the implied payment is more than her
value for the bundle — i.e. 2p>2(vi + ki); or the price is above h1,i nw h i c h
case bidder 1 cannot bid on both objects, as her budget constraint becomes
binding.
We begin by establishing an easy benchmark: without budget constraints,
the SACA has a ‘bundling’ equilibrium in which both objects always go to
the bidder with the highest total value, thus implementing the eﬃcient al-
location.6




<w i for each i ∈ {1,2}, there exists a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which bidder i wins both objects whenever vi +ki >
v−i + k−i.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1 each bidder bids straightforwardly, de-
manding both objects when p ≤ vi + ki and zero otherwise. This is always





can do so. Thus on the equilibrium path the bidders only
compete for the two-unit bundle. To guarantee that demanding one unit is
never a proﬁtable deviation, we select beliefs that assign high probability to
low values for any bidder who lifts only one button. Thus if bidder i releases
only one button (an out of equilibrium action) her opponent will not accept
to split the objects and will instead keep bidding on both objects up to her
value, because she expects to pay a low price. This makes the deviation
unproﬁtable.
6Chakraborty [5] discusses conditions under which various simultaneous (but non-
ascending) auctions may have ‘bundling equilibria’, i.e. equilibria in which the strategies
are such that a bidder either gets the bundle or nothing, so that the exposure problem
does not arise.
8The relevant implication of Proposition 1 here is that the sole presence of
complementarities is not suﬃcient in our setting to generate any distortion
from eﬃciency, as the exposure problem does not arise without the possibil-
ity of binding budget constraints.7 Thus the distortions from the eﬃcient
outcome that we are going to ﬁnd are due to the simultaneous presence of
complementarities and potentially binding budget constraints.
These distortions are caused by three eﬀects. First, there is an obvious
direct eﬀect due to the fact that in some cases the bidder with the higher
value for the two-unit bundle cannot aﬀord to pay for both objects, hence
the objects end up being split. The bidder who suﬀe r sm o r ef r o mt h i se ﬀect
is the one with the lower budget.
A second, more interesting eﬀect, is caused by the exposure problem that
is created for the high budget bidder, i.e. bidder 2. As we will see, there
are cases in which, in any noncollusive equilibrium, bidder 2 will lift both
buttons well before the total payment implied by the current price arrives
at her value for the bundle, because she is afraid of ending up having to buy
a single object and thus earning negative surplus. The loss of social surplus
in this case is not due to the fact that the objects are split, but rather by
the fact that the bundle may be assigned to the bidder with the lower value.
Interestingly enough, the bidder who is hurt by this second eﬀect is the one
with the higher budget, because it is the ‘poor’ bidder who is the ﬁrst to
reduce demand to one unit, thus creating the exposure problem for the ‘rich’
opponent.
Finally there is a ‘monopsony eﬀect’ that arises after bidder 1 lifts one
button at h1. (We will show that this happens in any noncollusive equilib-
rium). In this case bidder 2 faces a classic monopsonistic trade-oﬀ between
quantity (one versus two units) and price, and thus will generally lift one
button before the total payment implied by the price reaches her value for
the two-unit bundle. Therefore the objects may end up being split even if
bidder 2 is not budget constrained and has a higher value for the bundle.
Proceeding to the formal analysis, we deﬁne an assignment rule as a set








, i ∈ {1,2},w h e r eq
(j)






[0,1] speciﬁes the probability that j objects are assigned to bidder i when
t h et y p ep r o ﬁle is θ := (v1,k 1,v 2,k 2). An assignment rule is feasible if, for
7The exposure problem would reappear however if the objects were heterogeneous, (e.g.
if a bidder were only interested in one of the objects), even without budget constraints.
9each proﬁle θ, the allocation q(θ) is consistent with the fact that there are
two objects for sale.
Our ﬁrst proposition pertains to the direct eﬀect that budget constraints
have on the outcome. In any noncollusive equilibrium, a bidder can win both
objects only if her budget is at least as large as twice her opponent’s stand-
alone value. This is because the opponent reduces demand to zero only after
the price becomes larger than the stand-alone value.
Proposition 2 If q is the assignment rule of an equilibrium outcome, then
for each i =1 ,2,
q
(2)
i (θ)=0 if hi <v −i. (1)
The restriction in (1) generates a loss of social surplus because it immedi-
ately implies that the objects must be split (hence the complementarities
cannot be realized) whenever hi <v −i for each i ∈ {1,2}.N o t et h a tt h i si s
true in any equilibrium (with undominated strategies). Thus Proposition 2
identiﬁes an upper bound on the level of eﬃciency that can be obtained.
As we will see next, this upper bound cannot be obtained by any equi-
librium of the SACA. This is because of both the exposure problem and the
monopsony eﬀect, which induce bidder 2 to reduce her demand, to zero and
one respectively, before the total payment implied by the price arrives at
her value. It is worth pointing out that, while the exposure problem only
arises in the presence of complementarities, the monopsony eﬀect is most
severe when bidder 2’s complementarity premium k2 is zero, as the incen-
tive to buy the second unit increases with k2. Thus the overall impact that
the presence of complementarities has on the level of eﬃciency with budget
constrained bidders is ambiguous: while they create the exposure problem,
they also mitigate the monopsony eﬀect.
To see how these two additional eﬀects manifest themselves in all noncol-
lusive equilibria, ﬁrst observe that straightforward bidding pushes the price
to h1 when both bidders have suﬃciently high values, i.e. vi + ki ≥ h1 for
each i. Once the price arrives at h1, bidder 1 must reduce her demand, as
her budget constraint becomes binding. The next lemma establishes, that
her only equilibrium continuation strategy is to reduce her demand to one,
and then, if bidder 1 keeps demanding both objects, lift her second button
before the price resume its upward movement or bid on one unit up to v1,
depending on whether her stand-alone value is below or above h1.
10Lemma 1 In any noncollusive equilibrium, all types of bidder 1 with h1 <
v1 + k1 reduce their demand to one at h1, and then lift their second button,
if v1 ∈ (h1 − k1,h 1), and bid on one unit up to v1,i fv1 >h 1.
In light of Lemma 1 it is easy to characterize the set of all equilibrium
continuation strategies for bidder 2. Recall that in equilibrium, once the
price has arrived at h1, it is common knowledge that vi + ki ≥ h1 for each
i =1 ,2. After bidder 1 stops the price by lifting one button, bidder 2 can
reduce her demand to zero before the price starts moving again, thus earning
zero surplus, or do nothing until the price moves again and arrives at any
level p ∈ [h1,h 2], and then lift one button. The latter strategy yields both
objects at unit price v1 if v1 <p ,and one object at price p if v1 >p ,h e n c e
an expected surplus of
V (p|v2,k 2) ≡
Z p
h1
2(v2 + k2 − v1)dG(v1)+[ 1− G(p)](v2 − p),
where G(p) ≡
F(p)−F(h1)
1−F(h1) . It is easy to see that, as v2 + k2 approaches
h1, the integral in the expression above goes to zero and the second term
becomes negative, hence V (p|v2,k 2) < 0 for all p ∈ [h1,h 2]. Therefore there
exists a set of types of positive measure with v2 + k2 >h 1 for whom it is
optimal to lift both buttons before the price starts raising again. These
are the types whose behavior is aﬀected by the exposure problem. In this
case bidder 1 wins both objects, and the resulting allocation is ineﬃcient
whenever v1 + k1 <v 2 + k2.
For all other types of bidder 2, any equilibrium continuation strategy is
characterized by an optimal ‘stopping time’
p∗ (v2,k 2) ∈ arg max
p∈[h1,h2]
V (p|v2,k 2), (2)
which is often strictly below bidder 2’s willingness to pay v2 + k2.T o s e e
this, note that the ﬁrst derivative
∂V (p|v2,k 2)
∂p
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p=v2+k2
= G0 (p)k2 − [1 − G(v2 + k2)]
is negative for k2 suﬃciently small.
We now proceed to complete the characterization of the noncollusive
equilibria. We will ﬁrst present the case in which complementarities are
11known and identical, since most of the intuition can be obtained for this
special case, and then turn to the general case in which both stand—alone
values and complementarity premia are privately known.
3 Known and Identical Complementarities
In this section we discuss the noncollusive equilibrium of the SACA when
it is common knowledge that the bidders have the same complementarity
premium, i.e. k = k = k>0. To simplify the exposition we will assume
h1 − k>0; the discussion can be easily adapted to accommodate the case
h1−k<0 without signiﬁcant changes. Since complementarities are identical,
eﬃciency requires that both objects be assigned to the bidder with the
highest stand-alone value vi.
We deﬁne a pair of partition strategies as follows.
Player 1 (low budget player):
• types with v1 ∈ [0,h 1 − k] bid on both objects up to v1 +k, and then
reduce their demand to zero;
• types with v1 ∈ (h1 − k,h1] bid on both objects up to h1, and then
reduce their demand to one; if bidder 2 does not react, they reduce
demand to 0;
• types with v1 ∈ (h1,1] bid on both objects up to h1, and then bid on
one object up to v1.
Player 2 (high budget player):
• types with v2 ∈ [0,h 1 − k] bid on both objects up to v2 +k, and then
reduce their demand to zero;
• types with v2 ∈ (h1 − k,v∗
2], where the threshold v∗
2 is determined
by equation (4) below, bid on both objects up to h1 and then, when
bidder 1 reduces demand to 1, react by reducing demand to 0;
• types with v2 ∈ (v∗
2,1] b i do nb o t ho b j e c t su pt oh1, and then, when
bidder 1 reduces demand to 1, do not react; if bidder 1 does not lift
her second button, keep their demand at 2 until an optimally chosen
12‘stopping time’ p∗ (v2) determined by (5), and then reduce demand to
1, thus ending the auction.
The strategy of the low—budget bidder can be loosely described as follows.
First, types with v1 +k ≤ h1 bid straightforwardly, demanding two objects
until the price reaches v1 + k and then dropping both objects. All other
types bid on both objects until the price reaches h1 and watch bidder 2’s
reaction. If 2 reduces her demand to 0, they win both objects,
Second, types with v1 + k>h 1 and v1 ≤ h1 try to buy both objects
until the price reaches h1. At that point they lift one button, hoping that
the opponent will leave the auction. If the opponent leaves the auction then
bidder 1 gets both objects. If instead the opponent does not react, thus
keeping the demand at 2, then bidder 1 leaves the auction, since the stand
alone value is inferior to the price. Finally, types with v1 + k>h 1 and
v1 >h 1 behave much in the same way, except that they keep trying buying
a single object until the price reaches v1. Notice that these are exactly the
types that bidder 2 fears the most, since they are the ones who can get
bidder 2 exposed.
Consider now the strategy of the high budget player. Again, types with
v2+k ≤ h1 bid straightforwardly. The set (h1 − k,v∗
2] i st h em o s ti n t e r e s t i n g
one, since these are the types who fear the exposure problem and may leave
the auction against an opponent with lower value. These types demand two
objects until the price reaches h1. At that point, bidder 1 reduces demand
to 1, and bidder two has to decide how to react. To better understand the
problem of bidder two, consider what happens if the bidder does not react
(thus keeping both buttons pushed). In this case, either bidder 1 reacts by
leaving the auction, or bidder 2 remains in the auction. The ﬁrst case occurs
when v1 ≤ h1, and in that case bidder 2 obtains a utility of 2(v2 + k − h1).
The second case occurs when v1 >h 1.N o t i c et h a ti nt h i sc a s et h ea u c t i o n
continues with bidder 1 having reduced demand to one, so that bidder 2 is
forced to buy at least one object. This implies that in this case the highest
expected utility that bidder 2 can attain is given by




2(v2 + k − v1)dG(v1)+[ 1− G(p)](v2 − p), (3)
where G(v1)=F (v1|v1 ≥ h1).I fw ed e ﬁne
φ ≡ Pr(v1 ≤ h1|h1 − k<v 1)
13then we conclude that the expected utility of continuing to push two buttons
after the opponent has reduced demand to one is
H (v2) ≡ φ[2(v2 + k − h1)] + (1 − φ)V (v2).
This is a continuous and strictly increasing function of v2, and it is easy to
see that the function is strictly negative at v2 = h1 −k and strictly positive
at v2 = h1.T h et h r e s h o l dv∗
2 is the unique solution to the equation
H (v2)=0 , (4)
and it is an interior point of the interval [h1 − k,h1]. In fact, notice that
bidder 2 can always obtain a utility of zero by lifting both buttons. Thus,
bidders with v2 <v ∗
2 are better oﬀ by leaving the auction, since it is too
costly for them to be exposed to the risk of buying a single object. On the
other end, types in the set (v∗
2,1] obtain a strictly positive expected utility if
they continue to compete in the auction.8 At that point they have to decide
at what price p∗ to let the auction end, i.e. they have to decide the highest
price that they are willing to pay in order to try to get both objects. This





2(v2 + k − v1)dG(v1)+[ 1− G(p)](v2 − p). (5)
Notice that the types of bidder 2 such that v2 ∈ (h1 − k,v∗
2] always give up
both objects when the price reaches h1 and the opponent reduces demand to
one. This means that they will lose both objects against all types of bidder
1i nt h ei n t e r v a l[h1 − k,1]. If follows that whenever h1 − k<v 1 <v 2 <v ∗
2
the two objects go to bidder 1.
The next proposition establishes the existence of the equilibrium. Its
proof consists in showing that it is possible to ﬁnd a set of consistent beliefs
for which the partition strategies are sequentially rational.
Proposition 3 When k is known and identical across bidders there exists a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the bidders adopt the partition strat-
egy.
8Notice that it is never optimal for bidder 2 to react by reducing demand to one. Bidder
2 has always the option of keeping both buttons pushed, observe the reaction of bidder 1,
and then reducing demand to one immediately when the auction restarts.
14The outcome of the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is as follows.
• When min{v1,v 2} ≤ h1 − k, the outcome is the same as the one of
the the bundling equilibrium described in Proposition 1. The auction
ends with bidder i buying both objects, and paying v−i+k−i for each,
whenever vi + ki >v −i + k−i.
• When (v1,v 2) ∈ (h1 − k,1]×(h1 − k,v∗), bidder 1 reduces demand to
1 when the price reaches h1, and bidder 2 reacts by reducing demand
to zero. Thus, bidder 1 buys both objects for h1 each.
• When (v1,v 2) ∈ (h1 − k,h1] × (v∗,1], bidder 1 reduces demand to 1
when the price reaches h1,b i d d e r2 keeps both buttons pushed, and
then bidder 1 releases her second button. Thus bidder 2 buys both
objects for h1 each.
• When (v1,v 2) ∈ (h1,1] × (v∗,1] bidder 1 reduces demand to 1 when
the price reaches h1, bidder 2 keeps both buttons pushed, and bidder 1
continues to push one button. Thus, the price starts raising again and
bidder 1 bids up to v1 on a single object, while bidder 2 releases one
button at her optimal stopping time p∗ (v2) deﬁn e di n( 5 ) .T h u st h e
auction ends with bidder 2 buying both objects for v1, if v1 <p ∗ (v2),
and with each bidder buying one object for p∗ (v2) otherwise.
The value v∗ depends on the parameters of the model. It is interesting to
observe what happens to v∗ when h2 changes. When h2 increases, the value
V (v2) (weakly) increases for each value v2, since the constraint set expands.
Therefore the expected value of continuing the auction increases, and the
value v∗ (weakly) decreases. Thus, the lowest value of v∗ is obtained by
setting h2 =1in the deﬁnition of V (v2) and then solving equation (4).
T h eh i g h e s tv a l u eo fv∗ is instead obtained when h2 converges to h1 from
above. In this case it becomes pointless for bidder 2 to try to get both
objects, since the tight budget will force bidder 2 to reduce demand to one
very quickly after the price has passed h1.I n t h a t c a s e V (v2) converges

















1 − F (h1)
(1 − F (h1 − k))
2f (h1 − k).
It follows that dv∗
dk < 0. Since the magnitude of v∗ is a measure of the
severity of the exposure problem, we conclude that the exposure problem
becomes less severe as the value of the complementarities increases. This
is intuitive. When k becomes larger the expected cost of getting a single
object remains constant, but the expected beneﬁt of getting the bundle goes
up. Thus, more types will be willing to take the risk of pursuing the bundle.
4 Privately Known Complementarities
In this section we show that an equilibrium with the same qualitative prop-
erties of the one described in section 3 can be found for the more general case
in which both vi and ki are privately known. Again, for ease of exposition
we assume that k>h 1, but the case k ≤ h1 can be easily accommodated.
The pair of partition strategies is now deﬁned as follows.
Player 1 (low budget player).
• Types with v1 + k1 <h 1 bid on both objects up to v1 + k1 and then
reduce their demand to zero. We call this set A.
• Types with h1 − k1 <v 1 <h 1 bid on both objects up to h1 and then
reduce their demand to one; if bidder 2 does not react, they reduce
demand to 0. We call this set B.
• Types with v1 ∈ (h1,1] b i do nb o t ho b j e c t su pt oh1,t h e nb i do no n e
object up to v1.W ec a l lt h i sset H.
Player 2 (high budget player).
• Types with v2 + k2 <h 1 bid on both objects up to v2 + k2 and then










Figure 1: Partition of types for the low budget bidder.





[0,h 1] is determined by equation (7) below, bid on both objects up to
h1 and then, when bidder 1 reduces demand to 1, react by reducing
demand to 0. We call this set D.
• Types with v∗∗ (k2) <v 2 < 1 b i do nb o t ho b j e c t su pt oh1, and then,
when bidder 1 reduces demand to 1, do not react. If the opponent
remains in the auction, they keep their demand at 2 until an optimal
‘stopping time’ p∗ (v2,k 2) (determined by (6) below), and then reduce
demand to one thus ending the auction. We call this set G.
The main diﬀerence with respect to the case in which complementarities
are known and identical is that now the type sets are portions of the plane,
rather than an interval. Figures 1 and 2 show how the partition strategy
works for the low budget and high budget bidder, respectively.
The functions v∗∗ (k2) is computed from an indiﬀerence condition, i.e.
it gives the set of types (v2,k 2) who are indiﬀerent between not reacting
when the opponent lifts one button at h1 and lifting both objects. The
formalism parallels that of the previous section. First notice that, once the
low budget bidder has decided to remain in the auction, only the distribution











Figure 2: Partition of types for the high budget bidder.





2(v2 + k − v1)dG(v1)+[ 1− G(p)](v2 − p), (6)
and we will call V (v2,k 2) the value of the objective function at the optimal
point. We also deﬁne
ξ ≡ Pr(v1 ≤ h1|v1 + k1 ≥ h1).
In graphical terms, the conditional probability ξ is the ratio between the
probability mass contained in area B and the mass contained in the areas B
and H of Figure 1. The expected utility for bidder 2 of continuing to push
two buttons after the opponent has reduced demand to one is
H (v2,k 2) ≡ ξ [2(v2 + k2 − h1)] + (1 − ξ)V (v2,k 2).
For each ﬁxed value k2, the function H (·,k 2) is a continuous and strictly
increasing function of v2, strictly negative at v2 = h1−k2 and strictly positive
at v2 = h1.T h u s , t h e v a l u e v∗∗ (k2) is obtained as the unique solution to
the equation
H (y,k2)=0 , (7)
and it belongs to the interval [h1 − k,h1]. The function v∗∗ (k2) can be
characterized as follows. First when k2 =0we have v∗∗ (0) = h1. Second,
18the function is decreasing, since ∂H





=0 .I fb k2 < k then all types (v2,k 2) with k2 ≥ b k2 will not
react when bidder 1 lifts one button (this is the case pictured in Figure 2).
At this point, the task of completing the description of the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium can be easily accomplished following the steps used
in the proof of Proposition 3. We record this in the next proposition, which
we state without proof.
Proposition 4 When (vi,k i) is private information of bidder i there ex-
ists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the bidders adopt the partition
strategy.
The equilibrium outcome can be described as follows.
• When min{v1 + k1,v 2 + k2} ≤ h1, i.e. either the type of bidder 1
is in A or the type of bidder 2 in is C, the outcome is the same as
in the bundling equilibrium described in Proposition 1. The auction
ends with bidder i b u y i n gb o t ho b j e c t sa n dp a y i n gap r i c ev−i + k−i
whenever vi + ki >v −i + k−i.
• When h1 <v 1 + k1 < 1 and h1 − k2 <v 2 <v ∗∗ (k2),i . e .t h et y p eo f
bidder 1 is in B or H and the type of bidder 2 is in D, bidder 1 reduces
demand to 1 when the price reaches h1 and bidder 2 reacts reducing
demand to zero. Thus bidder 1 buys both objects at a price h1.
• When h1 − k1 <v 1 <h 1 and v∗
2 (k2) <v 2 < 1, i.e. the type of bidder
1 is in B and the type of bidder 2 is in G, bidder 1 reduces demand
to 1 when the price reaches h1. Bidder 2 does not react, and bidder 1
releases the second button. Thus bidder 2 buys both objects at h1.
• When h1 <v 1 < 1 and v∗
2 (k2) <v 2 < 1, i.e. the type of bidder 1 is in
H and the type of bidder 2 is in G, bidder 1 reduces demand to 1 when
the price reaches h1, bidder 2 does not react, and bidder 1 bids up to
v1 on a single object. The auction continues until the price reaches v1
(with bidder two getting both objects) or the optimal stopping time
p∗ (v2,k 2) (with the objects being split), whichever is lower.
The outcome of the equilibrium is ineﬃcient basically in the same ways
and for the same reasons described for the case of k known. One fact that
19should be pointed out however is that in the case of two-dimensional un-
certainty there is no mechanism that can implement a ‘budget—constrained’
eﬃcient allocation, i.e. an allocation that maximizes eﬃciency subject to
the constraints given in Proposition 2, while in the case of one-dimensional
uncertainty such mechanisms may exists. Since in this paper we do not deal
with optimal mechanisms, we do not discuss the matter farther and refer
the reader to Maskin [11] and Jehiel et al. [10].
5 An Example: The Uniform Case
To have a better grasp of the equilibrium, in this section we compute ex-
plicitly the equilibrium for the case in which vi is uniformly distributed on




. For the low budget bidder
we have








Pr((v1,k 1) ∈ H)=1− h1.
Suppose that k is suﬃciently large, so that we can conjecture that v∗∗ (k2)










2(v2 + k2 − v1)dv1 +( v2 − p)(1− p).
The ﬁrst derivative of the objective function is v2 +2 k2 − 1, so that the
optimal stopping time is h1 when v2 < 1 − 2k2 or h2 if v2 > 1 − 2k2 (and






(v2 − h1)(1− h1) if v2 ≤ 1 − 2k2
(1 − h1)v2 +( h2 − h1)(v2 +2 k2) − h2 + h2
1 if v2 ≥ 1 − 2k2
and we observe that V (v2,k 2) is continuous and strictly increasing, since we
have assumed h1 < 1 and h2 >h 1.N o t i c et h a t ,a sh2 converges to h1 from
20above, V (v2,k 2) converges to (v2 − h1)(1− h1).T h et y p ev∗∗ (k2) is found
solving the equation
ξ2(v2 + k2 − h1)+( 1− ξ)V (v2,k 2)=0
Consider ﬁrst the interval v2 < 1 − 2k2.I fv∗∗ (k2) is in this interval then it
must be the solution to









(1 − h1)((1 + ξ) − (1 − ξ)h1)
2(1− (1 − ξ)h1)
,
we have that the value will actually belong to the desired interval (i.e.
v∗∗
2 (k2) as deﬁn e di n8i sa c t u a l l yl o w e rt h a n1 − 2k2)i f
k2 <T(h1,ξ).
When k2 exceeds this threshold the relevant equation becomes
ξ2(v2 + k2 − h1)+
+(1− ξ)
¡




and the solution is
v∗∗ (k2)=





2ξ +( 1− ξ)(h2 +1− 2h1)
−
2(ξ +( 1− ξ)(h2 − h1))
2ξ +( 1− ξ)(h2 +1− 2h1)
k2
It can be readily checked that the solution belongs to the desired interval
only if
k2 >T(h1,ξ).
We conclude that the function v∗∗












2ξ+(1−ξ)(h2+1−2h1)k2 if k2 ≥ T (h1,ξ).
Since the absolute value of the slope is higher when k2 is larger, in the
uniform distribution case the types of the high budget bidder are partitioned











Figure 3: Partition of types for the high budget bidder in the uniform case.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have discussed the structure of noncollusive equilibria in
a simultaneous ascending clock auction in which the bidders are budget
constrained and have increasing marginal payoﬀs from the objects. Our
equilibria exhibit some intuitive properties, such as the existence of an ex-
posure problem for the high-budget bidder. The simultaneous ascending
clock auction has an eﬃcient noncollusive equilibrium when there are no
budget constraints, but it generates various ineﬃciencies when budget con-
straints are present. Not only objects are split too frequently, but it may
also happen that, because of the exposure problem, the low—budget bidder
may win the bundle even if her value for the bundle is lower than the value
of the high budget bidder.
22Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We specify strategies and beliefs, and show that
they form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium is symmetric, so
the two bidders have the same strategies and beliefs.
Strategy.T y p e(vi,k i) of bidder i keeps both buttons pushed whenever the
price is p<v i+ki, no matter how many buttons the opponent has previously
released, and releases both buttons when the price reaches p = vi+ki.A l s o ,
the bidder releases all the remaining buttons whenever the price is p>v i+ki
(this can only happen out of equilibrium).
Beliefs.A ta n yp r i c ep at which the opponent j has not released any but-
ton the belief on vj and kj is computed using the Bayes’ rule, i.e. the
belief on vj is given by F (vj|vj + kj ≥ p) and the belief on kj is given by
G(kj|vj + kj ≥ p). If the opponent releases only one button at price p then
the belief on vj is any arbitrary distribution with support [0,min{p,1}].
The beliefs are compatible with the strategy proﬁle, since they are ob-
tained using the Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path. We have to check
optimality of the strategy on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.
If at any p bidder i keeps following the equilibrium strategy then the
utility is max{2[vi + ki − (vj + kj)],0}. The only possible deviations are
releasing two buttons, which gives 0, and releasing one object, which gives
max{[vi − (vj + kj)],0}. Thus, no deviation is proﬁtable.
Out of the equilibrium path, the only case that matters is the one in
which the opponent has released one button at some price p0 <p ,w h e r ep is
the current price. Given the beliefs, the opponent will exit immediately the
auction, so that by keeping both buttons pushed the utility is 2(vi + ki − p),
since bidder i expects bidder j to leave the auction immediately. Releasing
one or two buttons yields (vi − p), which is clearly less.
The outcome of this strategy proﬁle is that both objects are sold to the
bidder with the highest value for the two-unit bundle, say bidder i,f o ra
price of v−i + k−i.T h u s ,t h eo u t c o m ei se ﬃcient.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Once the price arrives at h1, bidder 1 cannot
continue to bid on both objects. Reducing demand to zero is dominated
by reducing demand to 1, and lifting the second button if bidder 2 does
not react. Thus, in any noncollusive equilibrium, all types of bidder 1 with
23v1 + k1 >h 1 reduce their demand to one when the price arrives at h1.I f
bidder 2 does not react, it is optimal for all types with v1 ∈ (h1 − k1,h 1)
to lift the second button, as buying a single object for h1 would generate a
surplus of v1 −h1 < 0. For all types with v1 >h 1 it is optimal to bid on one
object up to v1.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have to ﬁnd beliefs which are compatible with
the proposed strategy proﬁle, describe behavior oﬀ the equilibrium path and
show that no proﬁtable deviation exists.
Beliefs are the same as in the proof of Proposition 1, i.e. they are given
by the Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path and they assign low values to the
stand-alone type of a bidder who drops only one object at any price lower
than h1.
The only relevant out-of-equilibrium path is the one in which some bidder
i reduces demand to one at a price p<h 1. Given the beliefs, in that case it
is optimal for the other player j to pursue both objects as long as vj+kj >p .
The reason is that bidder i is expected to drop out of the auction immediately
on the other object as well.
Finally, it is obvious (given the deﬁnition of optimal stopping time) that
no proﬁtable deviation exists for player 2 after bidder 1 has reduced demand
to one at h1. Also, no bidder can proﬁt from reducing demand to one at
ap r i c ep<h 1, since the opponent becomes more aggressive. In particular,
notice that if bidder 2 reduces demand to one at p<h 1 then the oppo-
nent will try to get both objects until the price reaches min{v1 + k1,h 1}.
The outcome is therefore that bidder 2 gets only one object at a price
min{v1 + k1,h 1}, making the deviation unproﬁtable.
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